Introduction
For the last twenty-five years urban bias has been one of the most prevalent theoretical framework s for analyzing urban-rural relations in developing nations . Urban bias is commonly thought to be of greater intensity and duration in non-democratic nations, in particular one-party systems . ' As post-Soviet states democratize and open their political systems to competition, urban bias would be expected to be mor e difficult to maintain . Robert Bates hypothesized that in "nations with competitive party systems, politica l competition for votes leads to a shift in policy in favor of rural interests ."2 According to this argument , rural groups in competitive political systems are able to organize for the purpose of seeking and mobilizin g electoral support, thus influencing policy in ways that are advantageous to rural interests . Moreover, rura l interests and the rural population at large present opportunities for urban interests to build support throug h alliances . In seeking out rural alliances, urban groups would court rural interests and make polic y concessions that benefit the rural sector in exchange for electoral and political support .
The analytical problem is trying to figure our why urban bias has remained, and even intensified , during increased political competition and democratization in post-Soviet Russia .' This article seeks to answer why democratization has been accompanied by such a significant decline in the ability of rura l interests to influence policy in ways that are beneficial to them . How are we to explain this apparent paradox, whereby democratization in Russia has been accompanied by economic policies and polic y outcomes that are characteristic of urban bias in non-competitive one party states ?
In addressing this question, the purpose of this article is twofold . One of the problems that scholars have been wrestling with is to identify the conditions under which urban bias dissipates .
Therefore, the first goal is to contribute to the specification of urban bias theory . This article present s aspects of the urban bias problem that have not been previously considered, and furthermore, have not bee n applied to post-Soviet states. The importance of political cohesion and differences over ideology have no t received the emphasis they deserve, thus creating a theoretical vacuum for understanding rural politics i n post-Communist nations . In particular, this article will contribute to urban bias theory by analyzing fou r factors that previously have been ignored (1) ideological differences between the state and rural interests ; bearing in mind what the analysis suggests about Russian democratization . Rural political weakness due t o ideological differences and lack of cohesion led to several consequences that affect the nature of rura l politics and the prospects for societal democratization . Political consequences include the ability to tur n policy preferences into policy, the need for urban alliances, and the alienation of rural elites .
Urban bias as an approach to rural politics
Flowing from the work of Michael Lipton in the mid-1970s, urban bias became widely accepted a s an explanation for why rural interests were often discriminated against in developing nations.4 The urban bias model became a powerful explanation for urban-rural relations in Third World and one-party states .'
Urban bias defines urban-rural relationships and the ways in which regimes extract resources from th e agricultural sector to the benefit of the non-rural sector . The urban bias argument maintains that states ac t to protect urban interests and discriminate against rural interests . The urban bias theory argues that financial, productive, and human resources are deliberately "pumped" out of the countryside in order t o benefit urban dwellers . Food producers are discriminated against on price and resource flows (although there may be variation according to type of production) . Urban bias, therefore, leads to extractive an d discriminatory policies against the rural sector .
Why does urban bias occur? According to the theory, the countryside is economically poor because it is politically weak.6 A politically strong countryside would act to prevent or block urban bias . It is relatively easy to understand how, in rural Africa for example, an unorganized, dispersed, largel y illiterate, ethnically or tribally segmented rural sector finds it difficult to defend its economic interests .
Second, urban bias theory maintains that the state is a not a neutral institution but rather a vehicle used b y urban interests to promote their good . The urban political elite uses the state and the instruments of power as a vehicle to discriminate against rural dwellers by intervening in markets and discriminating agains t food producers in order to ensure urban support .
At the same time, because states in which urban bias is found are dominated by the rura l population, the urban elite has to devise political strategies in order to develop rural alliances . Lipton and others argue that a common strategy for the urban elite was to "buy off' big farmers by providin g subsidized inputs and tax advantages. In return, large farmers support the urban elite even though they are discriminated against on price . Thus, urban bias discriminates against food producers, but not all foo d producers. Governments, therefore, intervene to protect urban consumers against high food prices . The failure to protect urban interests may result in political instability, as food riots in Indonesia in 1997-199 8 clearly showed . Robert Bates has summarized the situation governments face :
[G]overnments face a dilemma: urban unrest, which they cannot successfully eradicate through co-optation or repression, poses a serious challenge to their interests as employers and sponsors of industry . Their response has been to try t o appease urban interests not by offering higher money wages but by advocatin g policies aimed at reducing the cost of living, in particular the cost of food . Agricultural policy thus becomes a byproduct of political relations betwee n governments and their urban constituents .' Thus, urban bias theory theory emphasizes the state as a vehicle for urban interests and the difficulty of organizing rural interests . This article will use the state (at the federal level) as the unit o f analysis, an approach that is compatible with previous studies of urban bias, thus making this articl e directly comparable to the existing literature .
While there is diversity in the treatment of agricultural interests among Russia's 89 regions, an analysis of that diversity is outside the scope of this paper . It is worth noting that even where regiona l governments might be pro-rural, regional policies are not able to compensate fully for the disadvantageou s macro-economic policy environment (namely pricing and trade) that results from federal policies .
Agricultural performance is not necessarily better in regions where regional governments are "pro-rural, " and in fact, agricultural production during the 1990s fell most across southern areas commonly referred t o as the "red belt" because of their support for communist political candidates .
Urban bias in post-Communist Russia
Urban bias was a policy of long-standing in the Soviet Union . The philosophical basis fo r Communist peasant-state relations can be dated to Marx and Lenin . The real progenitor of urban bias , however, was Stalin and his policy of collectivization . While the post-Stalin leadership moderate d somewhat the excessively anti-rural orientation of the regime under Stalin, rural life remained primitive , harsh, and cruel . The situation in agriculture was aptly described by former General Secretary Mikhai l Gorbachev, who also served as party secretary for Agriculture during 1978-1985 : The traditional concept of the peasant as a second class citizen had a furthe r negative effect
The countryside, with 100 million people, received only 1 0 percent of electric power . ... A gas network was introduced in urban areas but farmers were deprived of it, and there were no plans to make gas available t o them.. . . Rural areas were badly off for roads, schools, medical services, publi c services, newspaper and magazine supplies, cinemas and cultural entertainment .... Statements claiming that agriculture was `unprofitable' were found to be wrong . All data pointed to the fact that much more was siphoned off from agriculture tha n invested in it. And, of course, the nation's economic development had bee n achieved at the expense of the c o u n t r y s i d e . 8 Gorbachev further notes that 60 percent of expenditures on agriculture went for industrial supplie s to rural areas, thus casting a new light on the monies invested in agriculture and our understanding of wh o really benefited from those policies .' Moreover, retail food prices were held artificially low to benefi t urban consumers . When the Gorbachev government unsuccessfully tried to raise food prices for the first time since the early 1960s, concerns over political instability were evident, and the government backed of f in 1990 . Gorbachev explains the situation : "At the time, any noticeable increase in retail food prices was resolutely rejected . The problem was totally divorced from economic considerations, and regarded a s purely a political issue . "'° When retail food price increases were announced in early 1991, the governmen t was careful to protect urban consumers by compensating for 85 percent of the increase in the form o f higher wages, despite warnings by economists that compensation undermined the logic of the pric e increase.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a significant deterioration in polic y outcomes favorable to rural interests during the period of economic and political reform -exactly th e opposite of what the theory would predict. In particular, the transition in post-Communist Russia has witnessed significant declines in financial resource flows to agriculture . 
Evidence of urban bias in Russi a
In the urban bias literature, governments use different strategies, both price and non-price, to discriminate against the rural sector . However, urban bias is not a simplified, linear, blanket policy applie d against all food producers . Governments differentiate among crops (cash versus export), as well as amon g food producers (large versus small farms) . Thus, while the rural sector as a whole is disadvantaged, not al l producers suffer equally, and some, based upon political alliances and urban links, may actually benefit .16
Nor is urban bias a single policy . Instead, urban bias is a constellation of different policies, which ar e applied in different combinations, with different degrees of intensity, according to the existing political an d economic conditions in a given country .
Generally speaking, urban bias has been measured in various ways . Basic characteristics of the urban bias model may be summarized as follows :
1) "price scissors" (price disparity) between agricultural products and industrial goods ;
2) lack of protection for domestic producers from foreign food imports ;
3) an extractive resource policy toward the countryside ; 4) domestic purchase prices which are below world market prices ; 5) low levels of investment and material resource flows to the countryside; 6) protection of urban consumers from the true market cost of food; 7) selective discriminatory tax policies toward food producers .
For purposes of this article, evidence of urban bias in Russia may be measured in four ways : pric e scissors between industrial input prices and agricultural prices for produce ; lack of protection for domestic producers from foreign food imports ; domestic purchase prices which are below world market prices ; and sectoral differentiation . Each of these factors is explored below .
Price scissors
During the Soviet period, state and collective farms benefited from state regulation of th e wholesale market . The price of farm inputs was controlled by the state, as farm inputs were subsidized an d
sold to farms at advantageous prices . Farms were largely shielded from price increases in basic inputs, fo r example fuels, fertilizers, and energy . These were political decisions, not really based on economi c rationale, and the consequences included steadily rising subsidies to producers and an ineffective use o f inputs, leading to waste and lower productivity than found in Western nations ."
In the post-Soviet period, wholesale and retail prices were freed from state control, and inpu t producers and suppliers were privatized (although not always de-monopolized) . As a result, the terms of and declines in real income among the Russian population, consumer demand for high preference item s decreased, which meant that farms had excess capacity and often found it difficult to sell their production , in particular higher priced animal husbandry products ,
To offset decreased domestic production, and as a benefit to urban consumers, an open trade polic y was pursued, leading to a significant increase in imported food . Prior to the collapse of the ruble in Augus t 1998, imported food was cheaper, of better quality, better packaged than domestic produce, In 1997 , Russia spent as much on food imports as was allocated to the agricultural sector in the federal budget : the equivalent of thirteen billion dollars . From 1992 through 1997, total meat imports increased 440 percent , including chicken meat, which increased over 2,500 percent, pork imports which increased by nearly 50 0 percent, and beef imports which increased by almost 245 percent "
By the beginning of 1997 Russia imported more than 50 percent of its total supply of poultry meat .
Overall, during 1997 Russia imported more than 35 percent of its meat supply, most of which came fro m the European Union, the United States, and China . Following the collapse of the ruble, which mad e imported food more expensive, Russian meat imports declined to about 29-30 percent of total mea t supplies. However, in the first quarter of 1999 imports once again rose to pre-collapse levels . The difference between domestic purchase prices and export prices is a common strategy of state s to raise revenue for investment, modernization, or other purposes . States benefit either through the direc t control of food trade, or by taxing the profits that private traders reap by buying low and selling high . This strategy is not unique to post-Soviet Russia and was used in the past, most notably to fund Tsaris t industrialization in the early 1900s, and to fund Stalin's industrialization during the 1930s, During th e post-Stalin period, the state paid lower domestic prices and sold at higher world market prices, However , the net effect was marginal for the state because Russia was not a significant food exporter, and the ne t effect was marginal on farms because they benefited from a range of subsidies, soft credits, low interes t loans, and price supplements which offset discriminatory pricing policies .
In the post-Soviet period, Russia remains a food importer and less so a food exporter . Therefore , farms derive a much greater percentage of their income from purchase prices, and much lower percentage s of income from credits, subsidies, and loans . In other words, many of the benefits that Soviet-era farms received to compensate for low purchase prices have evaporated during the post-Soviet period . Thus, farms are more dependent on "fair" domestic purchase prices . Furthermore, during the Soviet period, there was no pretense that there was a market economy, whereas in post-Soviet Russia market capitalism is th e official policy orientation .
Three significant aspects stand out in the relationship between purchase prices and export prices.
First, Russian farms are not being paid world market prices ; second, there is often a significant gap between domestic purchase prices and export prices ; and third, Russian food exports are being sold at somewhat lower than world market prices, The reasons for this disparity are partly higher levels of subsidization by other governments for food exports, a policy the Russian government has eschewed .
Another reason is deliberate state policy to underpay domestic producers, reminiscent of "primitiv e socialist accumulation" during War Communism . The following examples will illustrate the relationshi p between purchase prices and export prices in Russia .
Despite increased farm dependence on "market" prices for food production, domestic purchas e prices are often significantly below export prices, Export prices are a close approximation of world marke t prices, but Russian farms are being underpaid for their production, and the state is at least indirectl y benefiting from the gap between domestic purchase prices and export prices, Export prices for grain in th e US and Western Europe ranged between $100-$110 a ton during 1999 into early 2000, but farms in Russi a were being paid the equivalent of $50 a ton .27 For wheat, Russian farmers were being paid about 5 0 percent of the world market price, while the export price was 67 percent of the world market level . More generally, this pattern existed for several other important food products as well : the domestic purchas e price for corn was 34 percent of the world market price while the export price was 75 percent of the worl d level; for sunflower seeds : 13 and 64 percent ; for potatoes, 66 and 91 percent ; and for tomatoes, 90 and 120 percent, respectively.
Sectoral differentiation
As urban bias theory indicates, not all producers are treated equally, and this applies to Russia a s well. While agriculture as a sector suffered during the 1990s, one could argue that towards that latter par t of the decade the government was taking steps to help the animal husbandry sector, in which productiv e capacity had fallen the most, By the late 1990s, animal herds had declined in size equal to those in the early 1950s. Two policies in particular illustrate sectoral differentiation .
First, the relationship between domestic purchase prices and export prices was better for anima l husbandry than for plant products, State subsides for both animal husbandry and plant products decrease d significantly during the 1990s, For plant products, for example, subsidies comprised nearly 18 percent o f the wholesale price of grains in 1993, but only 2 .5 percent in 1997 .28 Similar declines occurred in anima l husbandry, but, animal husbandry products were paid closer to world market prices and could tak e advantage of exports, In 1998 . the beef producing sector received 55 percent of the world market price , while the export price was 58 percent of the world market level . Pork producers fared even better : in 1998 the sector received 96 percent of world market price, while the export price was 99 percent of the worl d market level . By early 1999, the poultry industry was being subsidized : poultry producers received 22 7 percent of the world market price, while the export price was 123 percent of the world market level .29
The second policy was the acceptance of food assistance from the United States and the Europea n Union, Throughout the 1990s, the United States had exported food to Russia, mainly poultry products . US policy was designed to help Russia meet its food needs given the decline in animal stocks and to provid e US farmers with export markets . In conclusion, the four elements of urban bias analyzed above have occurred in post-Soviet Russi a despite consistent and vehement opposition from rural interests . The question is why were rural interests unable to defend their interests better, and why were they susceptible to state urban bias ?
Explaining urban bias in post-Soviet Russi a
In the early 1990s, in order to address the agricultural problems inherited from its Soviet past ,
former Russian President Boris Yeltsin introduced a course of institutional and policy change that brok e sharply with the Soviet past : reorganization and privatization of state and collective farms, the privatization of processing and agricultural enterprises, land privatization and the adoption of supportive legal institutions, the creation of an individual private farming stratum, and the development of a land market .
Yeltsin's agrarian reforms were intended to transform Russia's agricultural economy along market lines .
The results of the reforms are beyond the scope of this article . 35 Suffice it to say that during the 1990s, Russian rural interests witnessed a deterioration in their social, economic, and political standing . Why ?
One plausible argument is that under pressure from international lending institutions, who use d loans as leverage to influence domestic economic policies, the Russian government was forced to adop t free trade and to pursue budgetary policies that led to the cessation of direct production subsidies from the federal government. In this respect, Russia diverged significantly from advanced capitalist nations such as the US, Japan, and the European Union, all of which protect their food producers and provide productio n subsidies (to varying degrees) . Ironically, rural producers constitute a small percentage of the population in these nations .
The argument forwarded in this paper concerns political representation, unity, and the ability t o turn policy preferences into policy . The weakness and division of agricultural interests has prevented the development of a cohesive policy agenda or the representation of rural interests as a unified front . Political division and lack of common goals, in turn, meant that neither rural conservatives nor rural liberals wer e effective in defending their interests .
To protect the interests of rural producers, coherent, unified, political organizations are necessary .
During 1989-1990, Russian agrarian leaders declared that a unified political organization was needed t o protect and promote rural interests, because this was not being done adequately by existing politica l organizations . On the eve of agrarian reforms in 1990, for example, one agricultural leader noted that "unless we have political power we will be unable to really struggle for the peasantry's interests ."36 Early on, rural conservative and liberal interests united, as did workers within the agroindustrial complex, thu s presenting a united front in the form of the Russian Agrarian Union . In time, however, the Union fractured as liberals resigned from the coalition because of disagreements over delegate selection and polic y positions regarding the interests of private farmers . Henceforth rural interests in Russia were divided .
To begin the analysis, the following hypothesis is offered to explain why rural interests have bee n weak The importance of political and ideological differences can hardly be overstated . When rural conservatives and rural liberals did work together, there is evidence that they were at least moderatel y successful . For example, in the summer of 1993, under joint pressure from rural liberals and conservatives , the Russian government raised the purchase price of grain dramatically and agreed to index grain prices t o inflation.37 Ultimately, price indexation was dropped in October 1993 because the government could no t afford to maintain those expenditures, but the point was made that rural interests, when joining forces , could influence agricultural price policy .
A full explanation of urban bias in contemporary Russia necessitates a consideration of rura l political actors, their policy positions, their alliances, and the consequences of these alliances . These aspects are analyzed in the sections below . 
Policy positions of rural actors
During 1993-1999, the Russian countryside was split along a liberal/conservative axis, preventin g formation of a rural united front that could influence policy and negotiate resource flows to the rural sector .
The split had distinctly ideological overtones, affecting voting patterns in the State Duma . At the core of the splintering of rural interests, liberals and conservatives have fundamental differences over the preferred course of agrarian reform and agricultural policy . Differences span a range of policy issues, includin g whether or not retail food prices should be regulated by the state, how much state intervention there shoul d be in the wholesale food market, and the degree of freedom in domestic and international food trade .
While advocating a mixed economy, the APR's party program insists that the economy should not be a laissez-fare economy, but a regulated market economy . There will be a mix of "market self-regulation combined with state planning and regulation ." The party also favors "strong state control over prices" i n order to forbid high monopolistic prices .
There are also differences over which sector of the rural economy should be prioritized fo r investment, credits, and loans . Rural liberals advocate a private farming sector based upon privat e property, backed by state protection of the legal rights of property owners. Rural liberals favor substantial state resource flows and other economic advantages to private farmers . Rural conservatives argue that th e most resources should flow to the largest producers -collective farms and their legal successors .
The most notable, and bitter, difference is over the land market . AKKOR and the Union of AKKOR's rural policy preferences were not fulfilled. Rural liberals argued for more financial resources from the state, better terms of trade, and higher purchase prices, while urban political interests , Russia's Choice, and the Yeltsin government resisted these claims . Financial policies of the governmen t hurt private farmers even more than larger farms because private farmers were more economicall y vulnerable . Several examples illustrate the ways in which rural interests were not served through the urban alliance .
First, in late 1994, the Yeltsin government ended subsidized credits to private farmers . During 1992-1994, the state offered subsidized loans at negative interest rates to private farmers . As a result, the number of private farms increased rapidly, from 49,000 in January 1992 to more than 285,000 in mid -1994 . Following the cessation of subsidized credits, private farm bankruptcies increased, the number o f new farms fell, and the overall private farm movement stagnated . At the beginning of 2000 there were about 260,000 private farms.
Second, rural liberals also wanted trade protection from food imports for nascent private farms, bu t the government pursued an open trade policy for food imports . In the largest cities, where the mos t concentrated support for Russia's Choice and economic reform was found, an estimated 70 percent of mea t and meat products came from imports .
Finally, private farmers were especially hurt by divergent industrial-agricultural prices becaus e private farmers derived more of their income from production and less from subsidies . Unequal terms o f trade and the price scissors discussed above had a direct impact on private farm production an d profitability . As new rural entrepreneurs, private farmers were vulnerable to the tremendous price increases of farm machinery and equipment, as inflation exceeded 2,000 percent in 1992 and 800 percent i n 1993 . In December 1992, one tractor cost from 800,000 to several million rubles . By December 1993, th e smallest, cheapest tractor cost three to four million rubles .' '
Surveys have shown that the largest source of investment capital for private farms came fro m farmers themselves . " Private farmers depended on state credits to meet operational and production costs .
As the price scissors went unabated, private farm profitability fell, so much so that by the end of 1994, onl y 20 percent of private farms were profitable .53 The rate of increase in the creation of new private farm s stagnated while farm bankruptcies soared . Rural liberals' alliances with urban parties failed to win them significant political representation , failed to create an effective bloc from which to influence rural policies, and failed to attain adequat e resource flows to the private farming sector . Despite alliances with political parties that were proprivatization and pro-private farming, the reality was declining federal support for private fanning, even a s the price of inputs increased rapidly . During the 1990s . rural conservatives had lobbied in three main directions : (1) to slow the pac e and course of agrarian reform ; (2) to slow the decline of resource flows into the countryside ; and (3) t o obtain Soviet-type state protection from free trade and foreign competition . Towards these end, the polic y planks of the "For Victory" bloc included : not to permit the sale or purchase of agricultural land "under any circumstances," to declare an "amnesty" on rural debt owed by large enterprises, to remove the pric e disparity between industrial and agricultural prices, to create a system of central state support for th e revival of the social sphere of the countryside, and to protect domestic food producers from "the negativ e influence of the world agricultural market" through custom tariffs and quotas . " Many of these planks lie at the heart of the APR's policy platform . so this split portends even greater difficulty for conservativ e interests in defending against urban bias .
Conclusio n
This article posited two goals : to contribute to urban bias theory by analyzing peasant-stat e relations in Russia, and analyzing what peasant-state relations mean for Russian democratization .
Previously, urban bias theory posited that rural interests were weak due to the inability to organize, whic h flowed from the level of societal development and logistical factors . Urban bias theory further argued that as states democratized, and the political system became competitive, rural interests would be courted fo r electoral support. Rural groups could build support through alliances and achieve their policy preferences .
This article demonstrated that the societal characteristics which facilitate urban bias in th e developing world do not exist in Russia . More importantly, even though rural interests have organized, urban bias has not dissipated with democratization in Russia . In fact, one could reasonably argue that th e relationship that existed during the final two decades between the Communist party and rural interests wa s replaced by even stronger urban bias . How to explain this occurrence? This article contributes to our understanding of urban bias by arguing that four factors which heretofore have been overlooked are of critical importance :
(1) ideological differences between the state and rural interests :
(2) the ideological compatibility of rural interests ;
(3) the internal coherence of rural groups ; and (4) the nature of political alliances formed by rural groups .
Divided, incohesive rural interests have contributed to intensified urban bias. Intensified urban bias in Russia flows from incompatible ideologies between dominant rural interests and the state , incompatible ideologies among rural interests themselves ; and from political and policy divisions between rural interests . Even when in positions of power, agrarian leaders were not able to stop the course of reform. Moreover, despite representation in the State Duma, agrarian deputies were not successful i n turning their policy preferences into state policy . As a result of political weaknesses, political alliance s were sought, alliances that harmed rural liberals and further divided rural conservatives .
Regarding Russian democratization, the fact that rural interests have been too weak to defend thei r economic interests or to ameliorate urban bias by turning policy preferences into state policy means tha t there is an unbalanced distribution of power, not just between institutions, but also between elites an d social sectors in post-Communist Russia . When one sector or elite continually "loses," democratization i s hindered because those outcomes reflect a concentration of political power to the detriment of one side , with few of the checking mechanisms inherent to consolidated democracies . Members of a "losing" sector have few incentives to institutionalize "democratic" norms and values . While the countryside always wa s more conservative than cities, Russian elections in the 1990s show that the countryside remained th e primary bastion of support for conservative forces and is the sector of the population most opposed to th e continuation of market reforms . In short, rather than democratization dissipating urban bias, urban bias creates further obstacles to Russian democratization.
